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Symposium:  Collective Management of Copyright:  Solution or 
Sacrifice? 
The Book Rights Registry in the Google Book Settlement 
Jonathan Band* 
Copyright law poses a significant challenge to any effort to create a 
comprehensive digital database of published books.  Approximately eighty percent 
of these millions of titles are still under copyright.1  The tremendous amount of 
time, transaction costs and uncertainty relating to clearing the rights to so many 
works is overwhelming. 
The proposed settlement of the litigation arising out of the Google Library 
Project presents one possible way of overcoming this challenge.  Using the legal 
device of a class action settlement under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
settlement would create a collective management organization, the Book Rights 
Registry, which would possess a nonexclusive license to all the works covered by 
the settlement.2  The Registry, in turn, would authorize Google to scan the works 
into its database and provide users with several forms of access to the works, 
including access to full text.3 
Just as this Article was going to print, Judge Chin rejected the settlement.4  The 
parties may appeal the rejection, renegotiate the settlement to address Judge Chin’s 
concerns, resume litigation over when the original Library Project is a fair use or 
seek legislative relief from Congress.  Regardless of the ultimate resolution, the 
Registry will become a model for the collective management of rights in the digital 
era.  The settlement’s detailed provisions concerning the operation of the Registry 
will make the Registry impossible to ignore. 
After providing a brief overview of the Library Project, the litigation and the 
settlement, this Article will review the settlement agreement’s provisions 
concerning the Registry.  The Article will then discuss criticisms of the Registry, 
 
 *  Jonathan Band represents Internet companies and library associations on intellectual property 
and Internet policy matters in Washington, D.C.  He represents library associations in connection with 
the proposed settlement of the Library Project litigation, but the views expressed here are his own.  
Portions of this article have appeared in Jonathan Band, The Long and Winding Road to the Google 
Books Settlement, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 227 (2009). 
 1. See Jonathan Band, The Long and Winding Road to the Google Books Settlement, 9 J. 
MARSHALL REV. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 228–29 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 262–64. 
 3. Id. 
 4. The Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136(DC), 2011 WL 986049 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
22, 2011). 
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particularly its potential to charge monopoly rents and its creation by means of a 
class action settlement.  Finally, the Article examines the feasibility of Congress 
establishing a collective management organization similar to the Registry through 
legislation. 
 
I.  OVERVIEW OF THE LIBRARY PROJECT AND THE SETTLEMENT 
In 2004, Google launched the Library Project, under which it intended to borrow 
on the order of thirty million books from major research libraries and scan them 
into its search database.5  For the nearly twenty-five million books still under 
copyright, Google argued that the “fair use” doctrine under § 107 of the U.S. 
Copyright Act allowed it to scan the books and display “snippets” of them in 
response to search queries.6  Publishers and authors disagreed and sued Google for 
copyright infringement in federal district court in New York in the fall of 2005.7  
After three years of litigation, Google, the publishers and authors announced a 
settlement on October 28, 2008.8  Judge Chin, then a federal district court judge in 
the Southern District of New York, held a fairness hearing on the settlement on 
February 18, 2010.9  Judge Chin rejected the settlement on March 22, 2011.10 
The settlement creates a mechanism for Google to continue scanning the full 
text of millions of books into its search index in exchange for: 
x payment to copyright owners, and 
x provision of a variety of services far beyond snippet display.11 
The settlement: 
x applies only to books published before January 5, 2009; 
x does not apply to periodicals; 
x does not apply to books first published in the United States that were not 
registered with the Copyright Office; and 
x does not apply to books in the public domain because they are not protected 
 
 5. Id. at 227. 
 6. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Band, supra note 1, at 228–30, 236–37. 
 7. Separate cases were filed in other countries, including France and Germany.  Although the 
German court dismissed the suit, the French court found Google liable for copyright infringement.  
Google is appealing that decision. 
 8. Band, supra note 1, at 227. 
 9. Judge Chin has since been elevated to the U.S. Court of Appeals to the Second Circuit; 
however, he still presides over this case. 
 10. Because the case could still be far from ultimate resolution, the Article will refer to the 
settlement in the present tense. 
 11. Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 05 CV 8136 (DC)). 
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by copyright.12 
The original settlement applied to books published before January 5, 2009, 
regardless of whether they were published in the United States or elsewhere.13  In 
response to the complaints of foreign rights holders, the parties amended the 
settlement in the fall of 2009 to exclude books published outside the United States, 
except if they were published in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, or 
were registered with the Copyright Office.14 
The settlement permits Google to provide its partner libraries with a digital copy 
of the books they made available to Google for scanning.15  However, the 
settlement places strict limitations on what the libraries can do with these digital 
copies.16 
The settlement allows for Google to offer three primary services to users in the 
United States:  previews, consumer purchases and institutional subscriptions.17  The 
settlement establishes “default rules” with respect to these services, which will 
apply unless the right holder elects to vary the rules with respect to a particular 
title.18  Different default rules apply to in-print and out-of-print books.  For out-of-
print books, the default rule is that Google can make a book available in all three 
services.19  For in-print books, the default rule is that Google cannot make any of a 
book’s text available in any of the three services.20 
Under the “preview” service, all users in the United States will have the ability 
to search Google’s entire search database for digitized books responsive to their 
queries for free.21  For an out-of-print book, the standard default rule is that Google 
may display up to twenty percent of the book’s text.  However, for different 
categories of books (e.g., fiction vs. nonfiction), Google may display a different 
number of pages per response.22  For an in-print book, the default rule is that 
 
 12. Google displays the full text of these books for free. 
 13. Band, supra note 1, at 320–22. 
 14. Id.  It has been estimated that the exclusion of foreign works from the settlement cuts the 
universe of books within the settlement in half.  Google, however, intends to continue scanning the 
foreign books into its search database and to display snippets in response to search queries.  In other 
words, Google intends to continue the existing Library Project with respect to the foreign books.  
Because the Amended Settlement Agreement does not cover these books, their rights holders could sue 
Google for copyright infringement for scanning and snippet display, and Google presumably would 
defend itself by claiming that its activities fall within the fair use privilege of 17 U.S.C. § 107.  Id. 
 15. Id. at 275–76. 
 16. Id. at 277–78. 
 17. Id. at 265. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Amended Settlement Agreement supra note 11, art. 3.2. 
 20. Id. art. 3.4. 
 21. The Preview service is discussed at article 4.3 of the Amended Settlement Agreement.  Id. art. 
4.3. 
 22. For most nonfiction works, Google generally may display no more than five adjacent pages at 
a time.  Additionally, Google must block the two pages before and after any five-page display.  In 
contrast, for works of fiction, in any given response, Google may display five percent of the book or 
fifteen adjacent pages, whichever is less.  Google must also block the final five percent, or at least the 
final fifteen pages.  No display is allowed of anthologies of drama and fiction by multiple authors, or 
collections of poetry or short stories.  And for dictionaries, drug reference guides, encyclopedias, 
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Google may not display any of the book’s text; it may display only bibliographic 
information and front material, such as the title page, the copyright page, the table 
of contents and the index.23 
Under the “consumer purchase” service, Google will allow consumers to 
purchase perpetual online access to the full text of a book.24  Google will set the 
price algorithmically between $1.99 and $29.99 (with eighty percent of books 
below $10).25  In-print books will not be made available for consumer purchase 
unless the copyright owner elects to “opt in” with respect to his or her book. 
Under the “institutional subscription” service, Google will offer institutions an 
annual subscription to view the full text of all books in the institutional subscription 
database (“ISD”).26  The institutional subscription could become an invaluable 
research tool in the higher education context because it will allow faculty and 
students to access the full text of millions of books from their computers.27 
The settlement allows the offering of two additional services: 
First, Google may provide free public access to the full text of the books in the 
ISD on a limited basis through public libraries and higher education institutions.28  
Public access service will be available at only one terminal in each public library 
building.29  At associate colleges, Google may provide one public access terminal 
for each 4,000 full-time equivalent (“FTE”) users; at four-year colleges, Google 
may provide one public access terminal for each 10,000 FTEs.30 
Second, the settlement permits “non-consumptive research” by “qualified users” 
on the “Research Corpus,” the set of all digital copies made by Google in the 
Library Project and hosted by selected institutions.31  Nonconsumptive research 
involves computational analysis of the books, and does not include research 
relating to the intellectual content of the books.32  Users are qualified through 
relevant institutional affiliation or demonstrated capability and resources to conduct 
 
price/buyer guides, quotation books, test preparation guides and thesauri, Google will provide only a 
“fixed preview”—it will display the same pages regardless of the user query, up to ten percent of the 
book.  Id. art. 4.3(b). 
 23. Id. art. 3.2. 
 24. The Consumer Purchase service is discussed at art. 4.2 of the Amended Settlement 
Agreement.  A consumer will be able to print out up to twenty pages with one command, cut and paste 
up to four pages with one command and make book annotations.  Id. art. 4.2. 
 25. The right holder can direct Google to sell the book for a price different from the price set 
algorithmically.  Indeed, the right holder can instruct Google to make the book available for free.  Id. art. 
4.2(c). 
 26. The Institutional Subscription service is discussed at article 4.1 of the Amended Settlement 
Agreement.  Id. art. 4.1. 
 27. An authorized user will be able to print out up to twenty pages with one command, cut and 
paste up to four pages with one command, make book annotations and provide links to e-reserve or 
course management systems. 
 28. The Public Access service is discussed at article 4.8 of the Amended Settlement Agreement.  
Id. art. 4.8. 
 29. Id. art. 4.8(a). 
 30. Id. 
 31. The Research Corpus is discussed at article 7.2(d) of the Amended Settlement Agreement.  Id. 
art. 7.2(d). 
 32. Id. 
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nonconsumptive research.33 
Unless a right holder takes action to deny Google the right to use her work, 
Google may provide the services discussed above with respect to that work.34  The 
legal theory underlying this “opt-out” framework, which applies to potentially 
millions of rights holders not personally participating in the litigation, is a class 
action settlement.  The litigation against Google took the form of a class action 
under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.35  A class action is a legal 
fiction found in American civil procedure where a handful of class representatives 
bring an action on behalf of all members of a defined class.  Typically, a few 
employees will bring an action on behalf of all similarly situated employees of the 
same employer, or a few purchasers of a product will bring an action on behalf of 
all other purchasers of the product.  If the presiding judge decides to certify the 
class, then any settlement or judgment can be binding on all members of the class.36  
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must review a class action 
settlement to ensure that it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”37 
Initially, the Authors Guild sued Google on behalf of all owners of copyrights in 
literary works contained in the library of the University of Michigan, one of the 
libraries that made in-copyright books available to Google for scanning.38  The 
settlement involves two subclasses of plaintiffs—authors and publishers of books 
published in the United States, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom.  Rights 
holders had the right to opt out of the settlement by January 28, 2010.  If a right 
holder did not opt out of the settlement by that deadline, and if Judge Chin had 
approved the settlement, the right holder would have released Google from claims 
relating to the Library Project, and could not initiate its own litigation against 
Google for infringement arising out of the Library Project.39 
II.  THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BOOK RIGHTS REGISTRY 
The settlement creates a collective management organization—the Book Rights 
Registry—to administer class members’ copyrights in the books subject to the 
settlement.  Google will pay for the Registry’s start-up costs.40  The Registry’s 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Band, supra note 1, at 261–62. 
 35. Id. 262–63. 
 36. A court must determine that:  1) the class is so large as to make individual suits impractical, 
2) there are legal or factual claims in common, 3) the claims or defenses are typical of the plaintiffs or 
defendants and 4) the representative parties must adequately protect the interests of the class.  FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23.  In many cases, the party seeking certification must also show that 5) common issues 
between the class and the defendants will predominate the proceedings, as opposed to individual fact-
specific conflicts between class members and the defendants and 6) the class action, instead of 
individual litigation, is a superior vehicle for resolution of the disputes at hand.  Id. 
 37. Id. at 23(e)(1)(C). 
 38. Band, supra note 1, at 263. 
 39. Id. at 288. 
 40. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, art. 5.2.  Google is required to pay a total of 
$30 million for the start-up costs and notifying class members of the settlement.  Id.  Reportedly, half of 
the $30 million has already been spent on two rounds of class notification; a second round of 
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board will be divided equally between publishers and authors.41  The amended 
settlement provides that the Board of Directors of the Registry will have at least 
one representative of the Author Sub-Class and one representative of the Publisher 
Sub-Class from each of the following countries:  the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia and Canada.42 
A right holder can register an ownership claim in a work with the Registry.43  
Claiming the work provides the right holder with the ability to control Google’s use 
of the work, as well as the right to financial compensation for Google’s use.44  For 
unclaimed works, the Registry would apply the settlement’s default rules.45 
The settlement agreement assigns to the Registry the following critical 
functions. 
A.  CLASSIFICATION OF BOOKS 
As discussed above, the settlement allows Google to offer three primary services 
to users in the U.S.:  previews, consumer purchases and institutional 
subscriptions.46  The settlement establishes “default rules” with respect to these 
services, which will apply unless the right holder elects to vary the rules with 
respect to a particular title, as discussed below.  Different default rules apply to in-
print and out-of-print books.  For out-of-print books, the default rule is that Google 
can make displays of the book available in all three services.  For in-print books, 
the default rule is that Google cannot display any of a book’s text available in any 
of the three services.47 
Google will make the initial determination of whether a book is in- or out-of-
print by consulting with existing databases.48  The Registry or the right holder, 
however, has the ability to challenge Google’s classification.49  Similarly, although 
Google will determine whether a book is in the public domain, the Registry or the 
right holder can challenge the determination.50 
A right holder that claims a work with the Registry can direct the Registry to 
instruct Google to depart from the default rules with respect to a specific work. 51  
 
notification was necessary when the parties agreed to amend the settlement.  See National Writers Union 
FAQ About the Revised Google Book Search Copyright Infringement Settlement Proposal, NAT’L 
WRITERS UNION, http://www.nwubook.org/NWU-GBS2-FAQ.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2011). 
 41. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, art. 6.2(b). 
 42. Id. art. 6.2(b)(iii). 
 43. Id. art. 1.122. 
 44. Band, supra note 1, at 288. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 265. 
 47. Id. at 261. 
 48. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, art. 3.2(d)(i). 
 49. Id. art. 3.2(e)(i). 
 50. Id. art. 3.2(e)(ii). 
 51. If Google receives a removal request before it scans a book, it cannot scan the book.  If the 
right holder requests removal by April 5, 2011 of a book already scanned by Google, Google must stop 
all uses of their digital copies of the book (although it can store the copies).  If a right holder makes a 
removal request after March 9, 2012, Google may not display any of the book’s text, but it can make 
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Thus, the right holder can “remove” a title from all of Google’s services under the 
settlement.52  Additionally, the right holder can change the default displays. 53  For 
example, for an out-of-print book, the right holder can require the Registry to 
instruct Google to exclude a title from consumer purchase and/or to display less 
text under the preview service.54  The right holder can also vary the price of a book 
available for consumer purchase from the price set algorithmically by Google; 
indeed, the right holder can require Google to make the book available for free.55  
Significantly, the right holder can direct Google to change how to use a particular 
title at any time.56 
B.  PRICING OF INSTITUTIONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS 
The Registry and Google will jointly perform the critical function of setting the 
price of institutional subscriptions.57  If they cannot agree on a price structure, the 
settlement provides for a dispute resolution mechanism involving binding 
arbitration.58 
The economic terms for the institutional subscriptions will be governed by two 
objectives:  “(1) the realization of revenue at market rates for each Book and 
license on behalf of Rightsholders and (2) the realization of broad access to the 
Books by the public, including institutions of higher education.”59  Moreover, the 
“[p]laintiffs and Google view these two objectives as compatible, and agree that 
these objectives will help assure both long-term revenue to the Rightsholders and 
accessibility of the Books to the public.”60  Google and the Registry will also use 
the following parameters to determine the price of institutional subscriptions:  the 
pricing of similar products and services available from third parties; the scope of 
the books available in the institutional subscription database (“ISD”); the quality of 
the scan; and the features offered as part of subscription.61 
Pricing will be based on the number of full-time equivalent (“FTE”) users.  For 
higher education institutions, FTE means full-time equivalent students.62  The FTE 
pricing can vary across different categories of institutions.  These categories 
include:  1) corporate; 2) higher education institutions (which may be sub-divided 
based on the Carnegie Classifications for Institutions of Higher Education); 3) K-
12; 4) government; and 5) public library. 63  Only higher education institutions can 
 
“non-display uses” of the book (e.g., retain the book in its search database and display bibliographic 
information in response to queries).  Id. art. 3.5. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Band, supra note 1, at 288. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, art. 4.1(a). 
 58. Id. art. 4.1(a)(vi)(4)(a). 
 59. Id. art. 4.1(a)(i). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. art. 4.1(a)(ii). 
 62. Id. art. 4.1(a)(iii). 
 63. Id. art. 4.1(a)(iv). 
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have remote access without Registry approval (e.g., faculty can access the ISD 
from home and students from their dormitories).64 
Google can charge a lower price for a discipline-based subset of the ISD.  
However, “[t]o provide an incentive for institutions to subscribe to the entire 
Institutional Subscription Database, Google shall design the pricing of the different 
versions of the Institutional Subscription such that the price for access to the entire 
Institutional Subscription Database will be less than the sum of the prices for access 
to the discipline-based collections.”65 
Google will propose an initial pricing strategy consistent with the objectives 
outlined above that will include target retail prices for each class of institution for 
access to the entire ISD and the discipline-based collections, and proposed 
discounts for institutional consortia and early subscribers.  After Google submits 
the initial pricing strategy to the Registry, Google and the Registry will negotiate 
its terms for up to 180 days.  If Google and the Registry do not reach agreement, 
the dispute will be submitted to binding arbitration.66 
FTE-based prices in the initial pricing strategy period will be based on “then-
current prices for comparable products and service, surveys of potential 
subscribers, and other methods for collecting data and market assessment.”67  
Google will be responsible for collecting data comparing the target retail prices 
with the prices for comparable products and services, and will provide this data to 
the Registry.68  Presumably, the arbitrators will rely on this data in the event of a 
dispute concerning the pricing strategy. 
The initial pricing strategy is expected to be in effect for two to three years.  
Google and the Registry will agree on the duration of subsequent pricing 
strategies.69  Should Google provide other services to institutional subscribers for a 
fee, those services would fall within the settlement and the Registry would be 
entitled to a portion of the revenue if:  1) the preponderance of the value of the 
service is realized through access to books through the institutional subscription 
and 2) the service exploits the access provided by the subscription in a manner that 
could not be exploited by other entities.70 
Under the settlement agreement, only Google and the Registry can submit 
disputes concerning the pricing of the institutional subscription to arbitration; the 
libraries have no recourse to the arbitrator.  In response to concerns raised by 
libraries about the pricing of the institutional subscription, on May 20, 2009, 
Google and the University of Michigan (“Michigan”) agreed to a new procedure 
that would allow Michigan and the other libraries that provided Google with in-
copyright books to request an arbitrator to review the pricing of the institutional 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. art. 4.1(a)(v). 
 66. Id. art. 4.1(a)(vi)(4). 
 67. Id. art. 4.1(a)(vii). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. art. 4.1(a)(vi)(4)(b). 
 70. Id. art. 4.1(a)(ix). 
BAND Final 12/5/2011  8:35 PM 
2011] THE BOOK RIGHTS REGISTRY IN THE GOOGLE BOOK SETTLEMENT 679 
subscription.71 
C.  DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE 
The Registry has the responsibility of distributing funds collected from Google 
and other parties to rights holders.  Rights holders that claim their copyright interest 
with the Registry can receive several forms of compensation.  First, Google must 
pay between $60 and $300 to the right holder of each book scanned prior to May 5, 
2009.72  Google must provide the Registry with at least $45 million to distribute for 
these scans.  The amount each right holder receives will depend on how many 
rights holders file claims with the Registry.73  A right holder must file a claim with 
the Registry by January 28, 2010, in order to receive this fee.74 
Additionally, Google must provide to the Registry sixty-three percent of the 
revenue it generates through advertising, institutional subscriptions and consumer 
sales.75  The Registry will then distribute the revenue to the rights holders.  The 
settlement contains a complex plan of allocation that the Registry must follow in 
distributing this revenue.  Once it has collected sufficient revenue from Google, the 
Registry will pay each registered right holder an inclusion fee of $200.  
Additionally, the Registry will pay rights holders usage fees based on how many 
users access a particular book.76  Under the original settlement, the Registry would 
have escrowed funds due to an unregistered right holder for five years.  If the right 
holder did not register a claim within the five years, the Registry would have 
retained some funds to cover its operating costs, and disbursed the rest to registered 
rights holders and charities.77 
The original settlement was criticized for not adequately protecting the interests 
 
 71. In many respects, Michigan has been Google’s primary partner in the Library Project.  In 
2004, it was the first library to sign an agreement with Google that allowed Google to scan books in the 
Michigan library for inclusion in Google’s search database.  To date, Google has scanned more books 
from Michigan than any other library.  On May 20, 2009, Google and Michigan entered into an 
amendment that expanded the 2004 agreement.  The new agreement addresses the provisions of the 
proposed settlement agreement between Google and the plaintiffs in the Google Book Search litigation.  
If the settlement is approved by the presiding judge, the amendment will govern the relationship 
between Google and Michigan.  Following the amendment is Attachment A, entitled “Collective and 
Certain Settlement Agreement Related Terms,” which sets forth provisions that will apply to all of 
Google’s partner libraries, not just Michigan.  This Attachment A contains the new pricing review.  On 
July 8, 2009, the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the University of Texas entered into similar 
expanded agreements with Google.  Tamar Fruchtman, University of Wisconsin-Madison and University 
of Texas Expand Google Books Agreements, INSIDE GOOGLE BOOKS (July 9, 2009, 10:27 AM), 
http://booksearch.blogspot.com/2009/07/university-of-wisconsin-madison-and.html. 
 72. Google must pay $15 for each “insert”—a separately registered work contained within a 
book.  See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, art. 1.75. 
 73. Id. art. 5.1(a), (b). 
 74. Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 1956 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 75. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, art. 4.5. 
 76. Id. at Attach. C, § 1.1(a). 
 77. Settlement Agreement, art. 6.3(a)(1), Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 
(No. 05 CV 8136 (DC)) [hereinafter Original Settlement Agreement]. 
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of rights holders who did not file ownership claims with the Registry.78  
Accordingly, the amended settlement agreement establishes an independent 
fiduciary responsible for representing the interests of the rights holders of the 
unclaimed works.79  The unclaimed works fiduciary will not be a published book 
author or a book publisher, and will be chosen by a supermajority of the Registry 
Board of Directors and must be approved by the court.80 
Under the amended settlement, the unclaimed funds will not be used for the 
Registry’s operating expenses and will not be distributed to rights holders who filed 
claims.81  Rather, the Registry, in collaboration with right holder organizations in 
Canada, Australia and the U.K., and in consultation with the unclaimed works 
fiduciary, can spend up to twenty-five percent of the unclaimed funds held for five 
years on searching for absent rights holders.82  After holding the remaining 
seventy-five percent for another five years, the Registry, with the approval of the 
unclaimed works fiduciary, may petition the court for approval to distribute the 
unclaimed funds to literacy-based charities.83  The Registry must notify the 
attorneys-general of the state governments, all rights holders located by the 
Registry and Google’s partner libraries of its motion to distribute the unclaimed 
funds.84 
D.  LICENSING TO THIRD PARTIES 
The Registry may license rights holders’ U.S. copyrights to parties other than 
Google to the extent permitted by law.85  At first blush, this appears to allow the 
Registry to authorize a Google competitor to scan and offer display services with 
respect to all the books that fall within the settlement.  However, the Registry can 
grant licenses only with respect to rights holders that file claims with it and grant it 
the ability to act as their agent with respect to parties other than Google.86  
Accordingly, if the rights holders of only ten percent of the out-of-print books file 
claims with the Registry, then the Registry will be able to license to a Google 
competitor the right to scan and display just ten percent of the out-of-print books, 
while Google will be able to scan and display one-hundred percent of the books. 
This limitation on the Registry is not a matter of choice by the parties to the 
settlement, but rather a function of the limits of the class action mechanism.  The 
class action mechanism cannot bind rights holders with respect to third parties, 
such as Google’s potential competitors, not participating in the settlement. 
Nonetheless, Google opponents pointed to other provisions of the original 
settlement that discouraged competition, most notably the “most-favored nation 
 
 78. Band, supra note 1, at 291–92. 
 79. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, art. 6.2(b)(iii). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. art. 6.3(a)(i)(2). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. art. 6.3(a)(i)(3). 
 84. Id.  State laws contain provisions regarding the disbursement of abandoned funds. 
 85. Id. art. 6.2(b)(iii). 
 86. Band, supra note 1, at 294. 
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clause” in article 3.8(a).87  Critics suggested that this provision required the 
Registry to extend to Google the same terms it negotiated with any other entity, 
thereby discouraging new entrants.88  The provision in fact was far narrower than 
the critics indicated.  It only applied when the Registry granted rights “from a 
significant portion of Rightsholders other than Registered Rightsholders.”89  After 
parsing through the definitions of “Rightsholder” and “Registered Rightsholder,” it 
becomes clear that this condition can be satisfied only if Congress enacted 
legislation granting the Registry the authority to represent the unregistered rights 
holders—a highly unlikely eventuality, particularly within ten years of the 
settlement taking effect, as the provision required.90  In any event, the amended 
settlement omitted this clause, presumably because of the controversy it generated. 
The settlement explicitly does not restrict Google’s partner libraries from 
engaging in other digitization projects outside of the settlement.91  Likewise, the 
settlement does not limit any right holder’s “right to authorize, through the Registry 
or otherwise, any Person, including direct competitors of Google, to use his, her or 
its Books or Inserts in any way, including ways identical to those provided for 
under this Settlement Agreement.”92  Thus, even if a right holder claims her book 
with the Registry, she can still license other entities to digitize and distribute her 
book. 
The settlement also contains a provision that allows the partner libraries and the 
Registry to compete with Google in the event that Google does not deploy services 
in a timely fashion.93  If Google fails within five years of the effective date of the 
settlement to provide free search (including permitted displays), the Public Access 
Service and institutional subscriptions for eighty-five percent of the in-copyright, 
out-of-print books it has scanned, the partner libraries or the Registry may seek to 
engage a third party to provide these services.94  If the libraries and the Registry 
cannot identify or reach agreement on a third party, the libraries may provide these 
services themselves, using the digital copies they received from Google.95 
E.  SECURITY OBLIGATIONS 
Google must follow detailed procedures to protect the security of the digital 
copies of the books it scans.  These same procedures apply to the libraries that 
receive digital copies from Google.  The Registry has the responsibility of 
overseeing whether Google or the libraries are meeting their security obligations.96 
Google and the libraries must develop a security implementation plan that meets 
 
 87. Original Settlement Agreement, supra note 77, art. 3.8(a). 
 88. Band, supra note 1, at 324. 
 89. Original Settlement Agreement, supra note 77, art. 3.8(a)(ii). 
 90. Id. art. 1.122, 1.132. 
 91. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, art. 2.2. 
 92. Id. art. 2.4. 
 93. Id. art. 7.2. 
 94. Id. art. 7.2(e). 
 95. Id. art. 7.2(e)(ii). 
 96. Band, supra note 1, at 280–81. 
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the requirements of the Security Standard, which is set forth in an attachment to the 
settlement agreement.97  The seventeen-page Security Standard addresses topics 
such as:  1) security management, including security awareness, designation of a 
security representative and incident response; 2) identification and authentication, 
including user identification and authentication, and authentication and password 
management; 3) access controls, including account management, access approval 
process and access control supervision; 4) audit and accountability, including 
logging and audit requirements, marking of image files and forensic analysis; 5) 
network security, including electronic perimeter, network firewall, device 
hardening, network security testing, remote network accessing and encryption of 
digitized files; 6) media protection, including media access, media inventory, media 
storage and media sanitization and disposal; 7) physical and environmental 
protection, including physical access authorizations, physical access control, visitor 
control and access records; and 8) risk assessment.98 
The Security Standard can be revised every two years by agreement between the 
Registry, Google and representatives of the libraries “to take account of 
technological developments, including new threats to security . . . .”  
Disagreements between the Registry, Google and the libraries concerning 
modifications to the Security Standard are subject to binding arbitration.99 
Google and the libraries must submit their security implementation plan to the 
Registry for approval.  If disagreements between Google or the libraries and the 
Registry as to whether the security implementation plan complies with the Security 
Standard cannot be resolved, they will be submitted to binding arbitration.100 
Each partner library must permit a third party to conduct an annual audit of its 
security and usage to verify compliance with its security implementation plan.101  
Google and the Registry will share in the costs of the audits.102 
Upon learning of a prohibited or unauthorized access to the database of books, 
Google or the library must notify the Registry of the breach and attempt to cure it, 
e.g., block the unauthorized access.103  Google or the library must confer with the 
Registry on ways to prevent such breach from reoccurring, and must negotiate with 
the Registry or the affected right holder an appropriate monetary remedy.104  If the 
parties cannot agree on an appropriate remedy, the issue will be submitted to 
binding arbitration.105 
III.  THE REGISTRY AND MONOPOLY PRICING 
Much of the debate over approval of the settlement focused on the privileged 
 
 97. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, art. 8.2(a)(ii). 
 98. Id. at Attach. D. 
 99. Id. art. 8.2(b). 
 100. Id. art. 8.2(a)(iv). 
 101. Id. art. 8.2(c)(i). 
 102. Id. art. 8.2(c)(ii). 
 103. Id. art. 8.3(a). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. art. 9.3(e)(ix)–(x). 
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position the settlement granted Google.106  Because Google was the only defendant 
in the class action, the settlement permits only Google to provide display uses—
e.g., the institutional subscription.  To be sure, the Registry would have the power 
to license to Google competitors rights for books whose rights holders file claims 
with the Registry.  But it is safe to assume that a large proportion of the rights 
holders will not claim their books.107  Many of the rights holders will not even 
know that they are rights holders; they may be heirs of deceased authors whose 
books have been out of print for decades.  Other rights holders will not know about 
the settlement or the Registry.  Still others will decide that the small amount of 
money the Registry will distribute to them does not warrant the bother of filing 
claims.  The settlement immunizes only Google from copyright infringement 
liability for scanning and displaying all the unclaimed books.  If a large percentage 
of the books remain unclaimed, Google will have a significant competitive 
advantage over other suppliers because it will offer a much more comprehensive 
catalogue. 
Even if other suppliers are permitted somehow to provide display uses of the 
unclaimed books, a competition problem would remain because the Registry would 
still control the rights to the unclaimed books.  The Registry would have no 
competition, and it could attempt to push the price of the institutional subscription 
to a profit maximizing point.  As discussed above, Google and the Registry will 
jointly set the price of the institutional subscription.  If they cannot reach 
agreement, an arbitrator will determine the price.  Google’s current business model, 
based on advertising revenue, suggests that Google may have the incentive to 
negotiate vigorously with the Registry to set the price of the institutional 
subscription as low as possible to maximize the number of authorized users with 
access to the ISD.  The Registry, on the other hand, may seek a profit maximizing 
price structure that has the effect of reducing access. 
A.  THE PRICING OF THE INSTITUTIONAL SUBSCRIPTION 
Libraries have great interest in the pricing of the institutional subscription 
because they constitute the target market for these subscriptions.108  Faculty and 
students performing serious research are among the largest and most likely 
populations to demand the ability to read the full text of out-of-print books.  Three 
library associations, in comments filed with the court presiding over the litigation, 
explained their concern over the pricing of the institutional subscription: 
 
 106. See Band, supra note 1, at 294–95.  In his decision rejecting the settlement, Judge Chin gave 
great weight to antitrust concerns, as well as the scope of relief under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, copyright concerns and international law concerns.  The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 
770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 107. In the debate over approval of the settlement, works unregistered with the Registry were 
labeled “orphan works.”  This is an incorrect use of the term.  Orphan works are works whose rights 
holders cannot be identified or located.  Here, no one has looked for the rights holders, so no one knows 
whether the works are in fact orphaned.  All that is known is that the right holder has not registered a 
claim with the Registry. 
 108. See Band, supra note 1, at 299. 
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[T]he predominant model for pricing of scientific, technical, and medical journals in 
the online environment has been based on low volume and high prices.  Major 
commercial publishers have been content with strategies that maximize profits by 
selling subscriptions to few customers at high cost.  Typically these customers are 
academic and research libraries.  Therefore, the Registry . . . may seek to emulate this 
strategy in the market for institutional subscriptions.109 
The Library Associations continued to describe other features of the settlement’s 
provisions concerning the pricing of the institutional subscription that increase the 
likelihood of this outcome: 
[T]he Settlement states that the price of the institutional subscription will be based in 
part on the prices of “comparable products and services . . . .”  Although there are no 
comparable products or services to an online database of in-copyright, not 
commercially available books, the Registry or the arbitrators might erroneously treat 
online journals as comparable products.  In this event, the institutional subscription 
would become cost prohibitive for most libraries.  The annual subscription for some 
scientific, technical, and medical journals can exceed $20,000 per journal.  A 
university library spends an average total of $4.3 million a year for online journal 
subscriptions.  If journal subscriptions are “comparable” to the institutional 
subscription, and a library pays $4.3 million for access to 31,000 journals, one can 
only imagine the price the Registry might insist upon for a subscription to millions of 
books.110 
The settlement provides that the price of the institutional subscriptions will be 
governed by two objectives:  “(1) the realization of revenue at market rates for each 
Book and license on behalf of Rightsholders and (2) the realization of broad access 
to the Books by the public, including institutions of higher education.”111  The 
Library Associations feared that the Registry might convince Google or the 
arbitrator to set the institutional subscription price at a level that favors the first 
objective over the second. 
The Library Associations further suggested that they might have little leverage 
in the negotiations concerning the price of an institutional subscription: 
Students and faculty members at higher education institutions with institutional 
subscriptions will be able to access the ISD from any computer—from home, a dorm 
room, or an office.  Accordingly, it is possible that faculty and students at institutions 
of higher education will come to view the institutional subscription as an 
indispensable research tool.  They might insist that their institution’s library purchase 
such a subscription.  The institution’s administration might also insist that the library 
purchase an institutional subscription so that the institution can remain competitive 
with other institutions of higher education in terms of the recruitment and retention of 
 
 109. Library Ass’n Comments on the Proposed Settlement at 8, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, 
Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 05 CV 8136 (DC)) [hereinafter Library Ass’n 
Comments].  The author of this Article assisted the Library Associations in the drafting of these 
comments. 
 110. Id. at 8–9. 
 111. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, art. 4.1(a)(i). 
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faculty and students.112 
In short, enabling Google’s competitors to scan and display the unclaimed books 
would not reduce the Registry’s ability to push the price of the institutional 
subscription up to a profit maximizing point. 
B.  TAMING THE REGISTRY113 
The settlement agreement permits only Google and the Registry to submit 
disputes concerning the pricing of the institutional subscription to arbitration; the 
libraries have no recourse to the arbitrator.114  In response to concerns raised by 
libraries over the pricing of the institutional subscription, Google and the 
University of Michigan agreed on May 20, 2009 to a new procedure that would 
allow Michigan and the other libraries that provided Google with in-copyright 
books to request an arbitrator to review the pricing of the institutional 
subscription.115  The new “pricing review” procedure would occur after the price-
setting process described in the settlement, including any arbitration between 
Google and the Registry.116 
Although this new pricing review could be helpful to libraries, it contains 
several significant limitations.  First, only Google’s partners can initiate the review.  
If these partner libraries receive discounts on the institutional subscription similar 
to Michigan’s, they may not have the financial incentive to pursue this new 
procedure.117  Second, while the procedure allows the arbitrator to order Google to 
adjust the price downwards, the adjustment amount is limited to Google’s net 
revenue—thirty-seven percent of the subscription price.118  Thus, the subscription 
price might remain beyond the means of many libraries.119  Third, the arbitrator’s 
decision is final and unappealable.120  This could be problematic to the extent that 
the arbitrator just “splits the baby” and does not engage in thorough review of the 
pricing. 
The Library Associations proposed two solutions for the problem of the 
influence the Registry would have over the pricing of the institutional subscription.  
Both solutions are rooted in the court’s continuing jurisdiction over the 
settlement.121  The settlement specifically provides that the court “shall retain 
jurisdiction over the interpretation and implementation of the Settlement 
 
 112. Library Ass’n Comments, supra note 109, at 4–5. 
 113. This subsection, with minor modifications, comes from Band, supra note 1, at 301–04. 
 114. Original Settlement Agreement, supra note 77, art. 4.1(a)(vi)(4), (viii)–(ix). 
 115. AMENDMENT TO COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN GOOGLE, INC. AND THE REGENTS OF 
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 24–26 (May 19, 2009), available at http://www.lib.umich.edu/files/ 
services/mdp/Amendment-to-Cooperative-Agreement.pdf [hereinafter AMENDED MICHIGAN 
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT]. 
 116. See Original Settlement Agreement, supra note 77, art. 4.1(a). 
 117. See AMENDED MICHIGAN COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT, supra note 115, at 11–15. 
 118. See id. at 27–28. 
 119. Library Ass’n Comments, supra note 109, at 9. 
 120. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, art. 9.7. 
 121. Id. art. 17.23. 
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Agreement.”122  The Library Associations asserted that by this statement the parties 
acknowledged the court’s authority to regulate their conduct under the 
settlement.123  The Library Associations “urge[d] the court to exercise this authority 
vigorously to ensure the broadest possible public benefit from the services the 
settlement enables.”124 
The Library Associations then offered two specific suggestions for ensuring the 
fairness of the price of the institutional subscription.  First, 
[a]ny library or other possible institutional subscriber must have the ability to request 
this Court to review the pricing of an institutional subscription.  The Court’s standard 
of review should be whether the price meets the economic objectives set forth in the 
Settlement, i.e., “(1) the realization of revenue at market rates for each Book and 
license on behalf of Rightsholders and (2) the realization of broad access to the Books 
by the public, including institutions of higher education.”125 
In a lengthy footnote, the Library Associations analogized the Registry to two 
organizations that collectively manage performance rights:  the American Society 
of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”) and Broadcast Music, Inc. 
(“BMI”).126  The Library Associations observe that: 
[b]oth ASCAP and BMI are subject to consent decrees resolving antitrust actions 
brought by the U.S. Department of Justice.  The ASCAP consent decree has existed, 
with modifications, since 1941; and the BMI consent decree since 1966.  Under the 
consent decrees, ASCAP and BMI must grant, on a non-discriminatory basis, either a 
blanket license to their entire catalogue, or a license for the performance of a 
particular work.127 
The Library Associations noted that a court in the same district as the court 
presiding over the settlement has continuing jurisdiction over the ASCAP and BMI 
consent decrees, and has established a rate court to resolve disputes concerning 
license fees.128  In proceedings before the rate court, ASCAP and BMI have the 
burden of proving the reasonableness of the rates they seek.129  The Library 
Associations asserted that, “establishment of a rate court in this case is premature.  
However, this Court has the authority to adopt the procedures necessary to ensure 
the fairness of the price of the institutional subscription.”130 
The Library Associations’ second suggestion concerned the composition of the 
Registry’s Board of Directors.131  The settlement stipulates that the Author Sub-
Class and the Publisher Sub-Class will have equal representation on the Registry’s 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Library Ass’n Comments, supra note 109, at 19. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (quoting Original Settlement Agreement, supra note 77, art. 4.1(a)(i)). 
 126. Id. at 19 n.47. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 18. 
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Board of Directors.132  The amended settlement agreement further provides that at 
least one representative of each sub-class must be from each of the countries whose 
rights holders are within the amended settlement:  the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia and Canada.133  However, the settlement is silent on who will 
select these board members and how class members can ensure that the Registry 
will in fact advance their objectives.134  The Library Associations expressed 
concern that the Registry’s Board of Directors might not adequately represent the 
true interests of many class members: 
[T]he Library Associations are both authors and publishers of books, and thus fall 
within both sub-classes of plaintiffs.  However, writing and publishing books is 
ancillary to the core mission of libraries—to provide the public with access to 
information.  Tens of thousands of members of the Author Sub-Class are similarly 
situated to the Library Associations:  teachers at all levels write books not for 
financial gain, but to support their core missions of education and scholarship.  Many, 
if not most, of these class members care far more about the potential impact of the 
Settlement on the advancement of knowledge than about the modest license fees they 
may receive under the Settlement.135 
The Library Associations, accordingly, argued that “many class members will 
not want the Registry to maximize its profits; rather, they will want the Registry to 
maximize public access to books.”136  The Registry will act as the agent for rights 
holders whose books will be in Google’s database.137  Google is building its 
database by scanning books found in the collections of major research libraries.138  
The Google database, therefore, will reflect the nature of the research libraries’ 
collections. 
The collections of research libraries are fundamentally different from the collection of 
a typical public library or the types of books sold in bookstores.  Research libraries 
contain primarily scholarly books.  Research libraries acquire popular books only if 
they are of scholarly interest.  Thus, of the 45,429 titles a major distributor sold to 
research libraries in North America between July 1, 2007 and June 30, 2008, the 
distributor categorized only 1,572 as “popular:”  “a work intended for a public library 
or a browsing collection.”  The distributor labeled none of these 45,429 titles as 
“geared toward a wide readership,” and classified 32,009 titles as aimed at 
“specialists:”  “those who have a familiarity with the subject matter and knowledge of 
the conventions of the field.”  Similarly, 12,297 of these titles were published by 
university or other non-profit publishers.  While these books are all in print, the 
proportions likely are similar for the older, out-of-print books in the research libraries’ 
 
 132. Original Settlement Agreement, supra note 77, art. 6.2(b). 
 133. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, art. 6.2(b)(iii). 
 134. Id. art. 6.2(b). 
 135. Library Ass’n Comments, supra note 109, at 18; see also Letter from Pamela Samuelson et al. 
to the Hon. Denny Chin, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y. (April 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/judge%20chin%20letter%204.27.09.pdf. 
 136. Library Ass’n Comments, supra note 109, at 18. 
 137. Original Settlement Agreement, supra note 77, art. 6.2(b); Library Ass’n Comments, supra 
note 109, at 16–17. 
 138. Library Ass’n Comments, supra note 109, at 3 n.4. 
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collections.  That is, probably less than 10% of the books are of a popular nature, and 
more than 25% of the books were published by university or other non-profit 
publishers.139 
To ensure that the Registry’s Board adequately reflects the perspectives of 
academic authors, the Library Associations contended that 
[a]ny class member must have the ability to request this Court to review the 
procedures by which the Registry selects members of its board of directors, and to 
evaluate whether the Registry properly considers the interests of all class members in 
its decision-making.140 
The Library Associations also requested the court to regulate the Registry on 
matters other than the price of the institutional subscription.141  The Library 
Associations observed that although the settlement permits the Registry to license 
the rights of registered rights holders to third parties, the settlement does not 
require it to do so.142  “Nor does [the settlement] provide standards to govern the 
terms by which the Registry would license these rights.  This means that the 
Registry could refuse to license the rights to Google competitors on terms 
comparable to those provided to Google under the Settlement.”143  Accordingly, 
“[a]ny entity must have the ability to request this Court to review the Registry’s 
refusal to license copyrights to books on the same terms available to Google.”144 
IV.  THE REGISTRY’S POWER AND THE CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE 
Significantly, the Library Associations’ suggestions concerning the regulation of 
the Registry all operate within the structure of the settlement.  Many critics of the 
settlement, however, argued that the sweeping powers conferred on the Registry 
vastly exceeded the authority of courts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
The Copyright Office, for example, opined that the settlement was “tantamount to 
creating a private compulsory license through the judiciary,” which thus 
represented an “end run around legislative process and prerogatives.”145  The 
 
 139. Supplemental Library Ass’n Comments on the Proposed Settlement at 11–12, Authors Guild, 
Inc. v. Google, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 05 CV 8136 (DC)). 
 140. Library Ass’n Comments, supra note 109, at 20.  When drafting the Amended Settlement 
Agreement to ensure representation of publishers and authors from the U.K., Canada and Australia in 
the Registry Board, the parties also could have reserved seats for representatives of academic publishers 
and authors.  They did not do so. 
 141. Id. at 19–20. 
 142. Id. at 17. 
 143. Id. at 17–18. 
 144. Id. at 20. 
 145. Competition and Commerce in Digital Books Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 67–68 (2009) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) [hereinafter Peters 
Statement].  In her oral testimony, Register Peters went further, stating that the settlement “makes a 
mockery of Article I of the Constitution.”  Id. at 64; Andrew Albanese, U.S. Register of Copyrights 
Slams Google Book Search Settlement, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Sep. 10, 2009, 
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/digital/content-and-e-books/article/13746-u-s-register-
of-copyrights-slams-google-book-search-settlement-.html.  At the September 10, 2009 hearing, 
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Copyright Office observed that “[c]ompulsory licenses in the context of copyright 
law have traditionally been the domain of Congress.”146  Accordingly, “[a]s a 
matter of copyright policy, courts should be reluctant to create or endorse 
settlements that come so close to encroaching on the legislative function.”147  
Additionally, “Congress is much better situated than the judiciary to consider such 
important and far reaching changes to the copyright system.”148 
The Copyright Office and other opponents made the narrower legal argument 
that the settlement represented an inappropriate use of the class action settlement 
process to create a commercial arrangement to prevent liability for future 
infringements.  The Copyright Office objected to employment of the class action 
procedure to “create mechanisms by which Google could continue to scan with 
impunity, well into the future, and to . . . create yet additional commercial products 
without the prior consent of rights holders.”149  The Copyright Office conceded that 
the class action procedure was used in the remedies phase of an infringement action 
brought by freelance writers against database publishers.  The proposed settlement 
in that case, which was approved by the district court, would grant the infringers a 
license to continue infringing.150  However, the Copyright Office distinguished that 
 
Congressman Hank Johnson (D–GA) agreed with Peters, stating, “the settlement comes very close to 
whittling away the powers of the U.S. Congress.  The treatment of orphaned rights holders is a matter 
that should be determined by Congress.”  Competition and Commerce in Digital Books Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 161 (2009) (statement of Rep. Hank Johnson); Stephen 
Shankland, Google Offers Rivals a Place in E-books Program, CNET NEWS—DEEP TECH (Sep. 10, 
2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30685_3-10349301-264.html?tag=newsEditorsPicksArea.0.  
However, Congressman Mel Watt (D–NC) said:  “[t]he best protection of the prerogatives of the 
legislative branch is for us to legislate.  Since we haven’t done very effectively the legislation of the 
orphaned works, it’s hard for me to condemn the courts to have a case before it that determines what can 
be done and can’t be done with orphaned works.”  Competition and Commerce in Digital Books Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 144 (2009) (statement of Rep. Mel Watt); Shankland, 
supra.  Similarly, Congressman Zoe Lofgren (D–CA) said:  “[w]hat I look at in this settlement is really 
the private sector achieving what we failed to achieve” with orphan works legislation.  Competition and 
Commerce in Digital Books Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 148 (2009) (statement 
of Rep. Zoe Lofgren).  Congresswoman Lofgren also indicated that Congress helped create the orphan 
works problem by extending the term of copyrights by twenty years in 1998.  Id.; Ryan Singel, Amazon 
Scoffs at Google’s Offer to Share Book Search Sales, WIRED—EPICENTER (Sep. 10, 2009), 
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/09/amazon-google-book-search-sales/.  Congressman Brad 
Sherman (D–NY) added that Congress had acted irresponsibly by failing to find a way to provide 
“access to all the knowledge in all the books for which authors cannot be found,” and that it would be 
irresponsible to prevent others from doing so.  Competition and Commerce in Digital Books Before the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 158 (2009) (statement of Rep. Brad Sherman). 
 146. Peters Statement, supra note 145, at 70.  At the hearing, Google’s Chief Legal Officer 
objected to the characterization of the settlement as a judicial compulsory license, noting that rights 
holders could opt out of the settlement or vary its terms.  Competition and Commerce in Digital Books 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (testimony of David Drummond, Senior 
Vice President of Corporate Development and Chief Legal Officer, Google, Inc.). 
 147. Peters Statement, supra note 145, at 70. 
 148. Id. at 73.  The Office stated that the settlement “could affect the exclusive rights of millions of 
copyright owners, in the United States and abroad, with respect to their abilities to control new products 
and new markets, for years and years to come.”  Id. at 67. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Settlement Agreement, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S.Ct. 1237 (2010) (No. 08-103). 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court ruled that 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) did not pose a jurisdictional bar to 
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settlement on the grounds that it did not involve “future uses of copyrighted 
products that were not the subject of the original infringement action.”151  The 
Copyright Office “wonder[ed] whether, as a constitutional matter, a class action 
settlement could decide issues that were not properly before the Court as part of the 
case and controversy presented during the litigation.”152 
Some rights holders made even more technical legal arguments about 
satisfaction of the class action requirements in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  They contended that the parties had made inadequate efforts to provide 
individual notice to class members.153  Rights holders also asserted that the parties 
had not met the class certification standards.  Scott Gant, for example, identified 
four groups of authors with materially distinct interests who should therefore have 
separate class representatives and separate class counsel.154  Professor Pamela 
Samuelson argued that the Authors Guild did not adequately represent the interests 
of academic authors.155 
On September 18, 2009, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a statement with 
the court presiding over the settlement that echoed many of these sentiments.  The 
statement advised the court to “reject the Proposed Settlement in its current form 
and encourage the parties to continue negotiations to modify it so as to comply with 
Rule 23.”156  The statement reiterated many of the concerns identified above 
regarding the representation of absent rights holders.  The statement contended that 
the owners of orphan works are “an incredibly diverse group,” and that the 
settlement pits their interests against the interests of known rights holders.157  The 
Statement further raised concerns about the use of the class action settlement 
procedure to allow Google to provide new services with the works of absent rights 
holders.  The United States stated that, “changing the forward-looking provisions of 
the current Proposed Settlement applicable to out-of-print rightsholders from an 
opt-out to an opt-in would address the bulk of the Rule 23 issues raised by the 
 
including unregistered works in a class action settlement.  Reed Elsevier, Inc., 130 S.Ct. at 1239. 
 151. Peters Statement, supra note 145, at 72.  As discussed above, the original complaint 
concerned the permissibility of Google’s scanning books into its search database for the purpose of 
displaying snippets as search results.  In contrast, the settlement allows Google to provide services that 
involve the sale of access to the full text of books. 
 152. Id.  The Copyright Office, however, acknowledged that “[w]e are not experts on the proper 
scope of class actions.”  Id. 
 153. See Objection of Scott E. Gant to Proposed Settlement at 13, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, 
Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 05 CV 8136 (DC)) [hereinafter Gant Objection].  For an 
analysis of the merits of Gant’s Objection, see James Grimmelmann, GBS:  Scott Gant’s Attack on the 
Class, THE LABORATORIUM (Aug. 21, 2009), http://laboratorium.net/archive/2009/08/21/gbs_scott_ 
gants_attack_on_the_class. 
 154. Gant Objection, supra note 153, at 31.  The four categories are:  1) an owner of a copyright in 
an orphan work copied by Google without permission; 2) an owner of a copyright in a nonorphan work 
copied by Google without permission; 3) an owner of a copyright in an orphan work not copied by 
Google or copied with permission; and 4) an owner of a copyright in a nonorphan work not copied by 
Google or copied with permission.  Id. at 34. 
 155. See Letter from Pamela Samuelson et. al., supra note 135. 
 156. Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed Class Settlement at 
27, Authors Guild, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 (No. 05 CV 8136 (DC)). 
 157. Id. at 8–9. 
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United States.”158  The United States acknowledged that “[s]uch a revision would, 
of course, not give Google immediate authorization to use all out-of-print books 
beyond the digitization and scanning which is the foundation of the plaintiffs’ 
Complaint in this manner.”159  Thus, the United States urged the parties to consider 
a “settlement that simply authorized Google to engage in scanning and snippet 
displays.”160  In other words, the United States encouraged the parties to take the 
Library Project back to where it started:  an index with snippet display of search 
results.  The institutional subscription and consumer purchase would be available 
only with respect to books whose rights holders had opted in for such access.161 
It must be stressed that the United States did not oppose the use of the class 
action settlement procedure to create the Registry.  Rather, it opposed the use of the 
class action settlement procedure to endow the Registry with the power to authorize 
Google to provide the institutional subscription and consumer purchase services 
with respect to the unclaimed out-of-print books.  Presumably, the United States 
would not have opposed the creation of the Registry that would administer 
Google’s payment of royalties for scan and snippet display. 
V.  THE LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVE 
Many of those who argue that Rule 23 does not allow the broad powers of the 
Registry advocate a legislative solution, noting the orphan works legislation that 
passed the Senate in 2008.162  The proponents of this approach overlook the 
substance of the orphan works legislation.  The legislation would have limited the 
remedies for infringement only if the user made a reasonably diligent search for the 
copyright owner prior to commencing the use.  The cost of performing millions of 
searches is precisely what Google is attempting to avoid through the settlement.  
Thus, Congress would have to adopt legislation far more generous to users than 
 
 158. Id. at 13–14. 
 159. Id. at 14. 
 160. Id. at 15. 
 161. The parties began negotiating the amended settlement agreement immediately after the United 
States filed its critical Statement of Interest.  Prior to the February 18, 2010 fairness hearing, the United 
States filed another statement with the court, arguing that while the amended settlement agreement was 
an improvement over the original settlement agreement, the amended agreement still did not address all 
of the concerns of the United States and therefore should be rejected.  Statement of Interest of the United 
States of America Regarding Proposed Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc., 93 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 (No. 05 CV 8136 (DC)). 
 162. In January 2006, the Copyright Office issued a report recommending legislation that would 
address the “orphan works” problem and enable uses when the copyright owner cannot be identified or 
located.  REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf.  These recommendations were 
embodied in H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006), reported out of the House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property.  The Senate passed similar legislation in 
2008, at the end of the 110th Congress.  S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008).  These bills, if passed, would have 
limited the remedies available to a reappearing owner if the user made a reasonably diligent effort to 
locate the owner.  In his decision rejecting the settlement, Judge Chin stated that, “the establishment of a 
mechanism for exploiting unclaimed books is a matter more suited for Congress than this Court.”  The 
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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what it rejected in two earlier Congresses; it would have to adopt a compulsory 
license that required no search by the user for the right holder.163 
There is, however, absolutely no evidence that Congress would enact such a 
compulsory license for books.  Indeed, the Copyright Office indicated in its 
testimony at the September 10, 2009 hearing that Congressional inquiry in this area 
should begin with orphan works legislation that would require a search for the right 
holder: 
A much more productive path would be for Google to engage with this Committee 
and with other stakeholders to discuss whether and to what degree a diligent search 
for the rights holder should be a precondition of a user receiving the benefits of 
orphan works legislation, or whether a solution that is more like a compulsory license 
may make sense for those engaged in mass scanning.164 
In response to a question from Congressman Lamar Smith (R–Tex), then the 
ranking Republican on the Judiciary Committee, concerning limits on 
congressional power to enact orphan works legislation, Register Peters suggested 
that a statutory compulsory license for the mass digitization of books might be 
inconsistent with international treaty obligations.165  In other words, Register Peters 
believes that the settlement is a judicial compulsory license that trespasses on 
congressional prerogatives, but that Congress itself perhaps cannot enact a 
compulsory license for book digitization without violating international 
obligations.166  In effect, Register Peters is saying that creation of a relatively 
comprehensive digital library providing access to the full text of in-copyright books 
may be a legal impossibility.  In the absence of either a judicial and statutory 
compulsory license, the digitizer would have to bear the cost of searching for the 
rights holders of over twenty million books.  This cost would be so overwhelming 
as to preclude any entity from undertaking such an endeavor.167 
Nevertheless, many of those who advocate a legislative solution believe that 
Congress does have the power to enact a compulsory license for the digitization of 
books.  Underlying the preference for a legislative solution is the belief that 
legislative process is more open and transparent than a court approved class action 
settlement, and that Congress would be more responsive than Judge Chin to 
concerns raised by their particular constituency.168  But the settlement has been 
criticized from all directions; rights holders, users and potential competitors have 
complained that the settlement does not sufficiently accommodate their interests.  
These interests often are incompatible.  If more competition leads to lower prices 
 
 163. The compulsory license could be administered by a CMO. 
 164. Peters Statement, supra note 145, at 72–73. 
 165. Id. at 67–68. 
 166. At the very least, Register Peters appears to believe that such a statutory compulsory license 
would subject the United States to “diplomatic stress.”  Id. at 68. 
 167. Register Peters took no position on the merits of Google’s fair use defense with respect to its 
creation of a digital index under the original Library Project. 
 168. Legal scholars who have criticized the legitimacy of the class action mechanism here have in 
the past condemned amendments to the Copyright Act as reflecting the entertainment industry’s undue 
influence on Congress. 
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for users, for example, then the rights holders would receive less revenue.169  
Likewise, more protection for rights holders inevitably would result in less robust 
services for consumers.  A legislated compulsory license could very well not apply 
to the works of foreign rights holders—not even the rights holders in Canada, 
Australia and the U.K.—and would result in a much smaller, less useful digital 
library.170 
The legislative process, therefore, would be highly contentious; in the unlikely 
event that Congress succeeded in enacting a compulsory license, it would reflect 
political compromises and the relative lobbying strength of stakeholders.  One 
cannot predict whether a particular stakeholder would do better in Congress than 
under the settlement; and one certainly cannot predict whether the compromises in 
legislation would be more “fair” than the compromises in the settlement.171 
 
 169. The Computer & Communications Industry Association observed that the concern about the 
anticompetitive misbehavior of the Registry “is another example of the fundamental tension in the 
various objections to the settlement:  insofar as one entertains the pure speculation of objectors, the 
proposed BRR cannot simultaneously be unfair to the class and anticompetitive, since any 
anticompetitive conduct that the BRR engaged in would benefit class members, if anyone.”  Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Computer & Communications Industry Ass’n on Proposed Settlement at 15, Authors 
Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 05 CV 8136 (DC)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 170. The Copyright Act already provides preferential treatment to foreign works.  For example, 
registration is not a prerequisite for a right holder of a non-U.S. work to initiate an infringement action.  
17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006).  Some foreign rights holders can be expected to lobby vigorously for 
exclusion from a congressionally mandated compulsory license.  See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in 
Opposition to the Settlement Proposal on Behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany, Authors Guild, 
Inc., U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 (No. 05 CV 8136 (DC)); Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Settlement 
Proposal on Behalf of the French Republic, Authors Guild, Inc., U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 (No. 05 CV 8136 
(DC)).  The Copyright Office appears to support such an exclusion.  See Peters Statement, supra note 
145, at 73–75. 
 171. Professor Pamela Samuelson has proposed a legislative solution that appears to adopt an opt-
out approach for snippet display, but an opt-in approach for full text displays similar to the institutional 
subscription or the consumer purchase under the settlement.  See Pamela Samuelson, Google 
Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 95 MINN. L. REV 1308 (2010).  As discussed 
above, an opt-in database may be far less comprehensive that an opt out database.   
  Conversely, Peter Eckersley of the Electronic Frontier Foundation called for a far more 
extreme solution: 
to require that anyone who takes a blanket license (whether under the Google Book Search 
settlement, or under any legislation that might expand the settlement to others) must deposit a 
copy of the raw scans that they create with the Library of Congress or with the entity that 
administers the blanket license (e.g., the Books Rights Registry).  After a period of years, let’s 
say fourteen, the term of the Founder’s Copyright, those scans should be made available at no 
cost to any others who take the relevant copyright licenses. 
Peter Eckersley, Google Book Search Settlement:  Foster Competition, Escrow the Scans, EFF—
DEEPLINKS BLOG (Jun. 11, 2009), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/06/should-google-have-s.  
Eckersley notes that “[t]his would not only encourage market entry and competition in the online digital 
books arena, but would also foster innovation in the field.”  Id.  He argues: 
It makes no economic sense for us to force every future pair of graduate students who want to 
experiment with the book dataset to spend those hundreds of millions of dollars before they can 
launch their new startup.  On the other hand, Google deserves some fair reward for navigating 
the obstacles and getting the books scanned.  A compromise like a 14-year escrow rule might be 
just the way to achieve that. 
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VI.  FINAL REFLECTIONS ON THE REGISTRY AS A COLLECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION 
  If the Google Book Settlement ultimately receives judicial approval, the 
Registry would constitute an extended collective licensing mechanism; the Registry 
would have the authority to license rights on behalf of absent rights holders.  The 
Registry would differ from other extended CMOs in that it is designed largely to 
solve a “legacy” problem—the enormous cost of clearing the rights to a finite set of 
existing works—books published before January 5, 2009.  Books published after 
that date would be managed by the Registry only with the consent of their rights 
holders, and thus would not be subject to the extended collective licensing regime. 
The Registry would also differ from other CMOs with respect to its origins.  
While most CMOs worldwide are created by statute or by the voluntary agreement 
of rights holders, the Registry is the result of a settlement of class action litigation.  
Because of its origin in a class action settlement, the Registry is not able to license 
the works under its control equally.  It can license all works within the settlement, 
both claimed and unclaimed, only to Google.  In contrast, it can license to third 
parties only works claimed by their rights holders. 
Obviously, this differential treatment provides Google with an advantage over 
competitors with respect to the sale of access to books and arguably the Internet 
search market.  (Of course, the extent of this competitive advantage is unclear, 
given that it applies only to the unclaimed books published before January 5, 2009.)  
Providing equal treatment to all parties would be more fair to Google’s 
competitors.  But equal treatment would disadvantage users.  Without legislation, 
equal treatment would mean that Google could provide users with access only to 
books claimed by rights holders.  It is safe to assume that a not insignificant 
number of rights holders would fail to claim their books.  Google would not be able 
to include these books in the institutional subscription database, and it would not be 
able to make these books available for consumer purchase.  Users, therefore, would 
 
Id.  Google, of course, would never agree to relinquish control over its enormous investment in creating 
a digital database of books after fourteen years.  Nor would Congress require it to do so. 
  The Open Book Alliance similarly stated that “[a]ppropriate modifications of the parties’ 
proposal might begin with compulsory licensing of the database.”  Memorandum of Amicus Curiae 
Open Book Alliance in Opposition to the Proposed Settlement Between the Authors Guild, Inc., 
Association of America Publishers, Inc., and Google Inc. at 29, Authors Guild, Inc., U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 
(No. 05 CV .8136 (DC)).  It further stated: 
Google should be ordered to license the database with all attendant rights to a number of 
competitors, under the supervision of the Department of Justice.  Unlike physical assets such as 
plants and equipment, the database can be copied quickly and accurately, and conveyed through 
licensing agreements to companies that will compete against Google by selling digital books and 
library subscriptions.  These licensees must be permitted, in turn, to sell competitors of Google 
and the publishers the right to crawl and index the database for their own commercial uses, in 
order to prevent competitive injury to the search market. 
Id. at 29–30.  The Open Book Alliance asserted that “[c]ompetitors should pay, at most, nominal 
amounts to Google to license the database for resale.  Not-for-profit institutions that wish to scan orphan 
works for the purpose of creating a better database than the one Google offers should be entitled to 
license the necessary rights from Google free of charge.”  Id. at 31. 
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receive access to fewer books.  Access from a single source is better than no access 
at all. 
Although the Registry has these unique attributes, it also possesses many of the 
qualities of other CMOs.  It represents an efficient means of licensing the rights in 
a large number of works.  At the same time, without proper oversight it could 
engage in monopoly pricing.  Additionally, it would collect revenue with respect to 
unclaimed works.  Under the original settlement, these funds would have been 
retained by the Registry for operating expenses, or would have been transferred to 
the rights holders would did claim their works.  Under the amended settlement, the 
Registry will spend a quarter of these funds on searching for absent rights holders, 
and distribute the other three quarters to literacy-based charities.  Although these 
charities may be meritorious, the collection of fees for unclaimed works represents 
an unwelcome cost to consumers. 
